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# Wireless Networks

## Lecture 17: Wireless LANs

### 802.11 Management

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
## Outline

- **Brief history**
- **802 protocol overview**
- **Wireless LANs – 802.11 – overview**
- **802.11 MAC, frame format, operations**
- **802.11 management**
- **802.11 security**
- **802.11 power control**
- **802.11\***
- **802.11 QoS**

## Management and Control Services

- Association management
- Handoff
- Security: authentication and privacy
- Power management
- QoS

## 802.11: Infrastructure Reminder



- **Station (STA)**
  - » terminal with access mechanisms to the wireless medium and radio contact to the access point
- **Access Point**
  - » station integrated into the wireless LAN and the distribution system
- **Basic Service Set (BSS)**
  - » group of stations using the same AP
- **Portal**
  - » bridge to other (wired) networks
- **Distribution System**
  - » interconnection network to form one logical network (ESS: Extended Service Set) based on several BSS

## Service Set Identifier - SSID

- **Mechanism used to segment wireless networks**
  - » Multiple independent wireless networks can coexist in the same location
  - » Effectively the name of the wireless network
- **Each AP is programmed with a SSID that corresponds to its network**
- **Client computer presents correct SSID to access AP**
- **Security Compromises**
  - » AP can be configured to “broadcast” its SSID
  - » Broadcasting can be disabled to improve security
  - » SSID may be shared among users of the wireless segment

## Association Management

- **Stations must associate with an AP before they can use the wireless network**
  - » AP must know about them so it can forward packets
  - » Often also must authenticate
- **Association is initiated by the wireless host – involves multiple steps:**
  1. **Scanning:** finding out what access points are available
  2. **Selection:** deciding what AP (or ESS) to use
  3. **Association:** protocol to “sign up” with AP – involves exchange of parameters
  4. **Authentication:** needed to gain access to secure APs – many options possible
- **Disassociation:** station or AP can terminate association

## Association Management: Scanning

- **Stations can detect AP based by scanning**
- **Passive Scanning: station simply listens for Beacon and gets info of the BSS**
  - » Beacons are sent roughly 10 times per second
  - » Power is saved
- **Active Scanning: station transmits Probe Request; elicits Probe Response from AP**
  - » Saves time + is more thorough
  - » Wait for 10-20 msec for response
- **Scanning all available channels can become very time consuming!**
  - » Especially with passive scanning
  - » Cannot transmit and receive frames during most of that time – not a big problem during initial association

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## Association Management: Selecting an AP and Joining

- **Selecting a BSS or ESS typically must involve the user**
  - » What networks do you trust? Are you willing to pay?
  - » Can be done automatically based on stated user preferences (e.g. the “automatic” list in Windows)
- **The wireless host selects the AP it will use in an ESS based on vendor-specific algorithm**
  - » Uses the information from the scan
  - » Typically simply joins the AP with the strongest signal
- **Associating with an AP**
  - » Synchronization in Timestamp Field and frequency
  - » Adopt PHY parameters
  - » Other parameters: BSSID, WEP, Beacon Period, etc.

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## Association Management: Roaming

- **Reassociation: association is transferred from active AP to a new target AP**
  - » Supports mobility in the same ESS – layer 2 roaming
- **Reassociation is initiated by wireless host based on vendor specific algorithms**
  - » Implemented using an Association Request Frame that is sent to the new AP
  - » New AP accepts or rejects the request using an Association Response Frame
- **Coordination between APs is defined in 802.11f**
  - » Allows forwarding of frames in multi-vendor networks
  - » Inter-AP authentication and discovery typically coordinated using a RADIUS server
  - » “Fast roaming” support (802.11r) also streamlines authentication and QoS, e.g. for VoIP

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
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## Association Management: Reassociation Algorithms

- **Failure driven: only try to reassociate after connection to current AP is lost**
  - » Typically efficient for stationary clients since it not common that the best AP changes during a session
  - » Mostly useful for nomadic clients
  - » Can be very disruptive for mobile devices
- **Proactive reassociation: periodically try to find an AP with a stronger signal**
  - » Tricky part: cannot communicate while scanning other channels
  - » Trick: user power save mode to “hold” messages
  - » Throughput during scanning is still affected though
    - Mostly affects latency sensitive applications

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## WLAN Security Requirements

- **Authentication:** only allow authorized stations to associate with and use the AP
- **Confidentiality:** hide the contents of traffic from unauthorized parties
- **Integrity:** make sure traffic contents is not modified while in transit

## WLAN Security Exploits

- **Insertion attacks: unauthorized Clients or AP**
  - » Client: reuse MAC or IP address –free service on “secured” APs
  - » AP: impersonate an AP, e.g., use well known name
- **Interception and unauthorized monitoring**
  - » Packet Analysis by “sniffing” – listening to all traffic
- **Brute Force Attacks Against AP Passwords**
  - » Dictionary Attacks Against SSID
- **Encryption Attacks**
  - » Exploit known weaknesses of WEP
- **Misconfigurations, e.g., use default password**
- **Jamming – denial of service**
  - » Cordless phones, baby monitors, leaky microwave oven, etc.

## Security in 802.11b

- **WEP: Wired Equivalent Privacy**
  - » Achieve privacy similar to that on LAN through encryption
  - » Intended to provide both privacy and integrity
  - » RC4 and CRC32
  - » Has known vulnerabilities
- **WPA: Wi-Fi Protected Access**
  - » Larger, dynamically changed keys
- **802.1x: port-based authentication for LANs**
  - » Port-based authentication for LANs
- **802.11i (WPA2)**
  - » Builds on WPA
  - » Uses AES for encryption

## MAC Filtering

- **Each client is identified by its 802.11 Mac Address**
- **Each AP can be programmed with the set of MAC addresses it accepts (“white list”)**
- **Combine this filtering with the AP’s SSID**
- **Very simple solution**
  - » Some overhead to maintain list of MAC addresses
- **But it is possible to forge MAC addresses ...**
  - » Unauthorized client can “borrow” the MAC address of an authenticated client
  - » Built in firewall will discard unexpected packets



## Wired Equivalent Privacy WEP

- **Original standard for WiFi security**
- **Very weak standard: key could be cracked with a couple of hours of computing (much faster today)**
  - » Too much information is transmitted in the clear
  - » No protocol for encryption key distribution
  - » Clever optimizations can reduce time to minutes
- **All data then becomes vulnerable to interception**
  - » WEP typically uses a single shared key for all stations
- **The CRC32 check is also vulnerable so that the data could be altered as well**
  - » Can make changes without even decrypting!
- **128-bit WEP encryption is recommended**

## Port-based Authentication

- **802.1x is the IEEE standard for port-based authentication**
- **Users get a username/password to access the access point**
- **Was originally defined for switches but extended to APs**
- **Can be used to bootstrap other security mechanisms**
  - » Effectively creating a session

## Wi-Fi Protected Access WPA

- Introduced by Wi-Fi Alliance as an interim solution after WEP flaws were published
  - › Uses a different Message Integrity Check
  - › Encryption still based on RC4, but uses 176 bit key (48bit IV) and keys are changed periodically
  - › Also frame counter in MIC to prevent replay attacks.
- Can be used with 802.1x authentication (optional)
  - › It generates a long WPA key that is randomly generated, uniquely assigned and frequently changed.
  - › Attacks are still possible since people sometimes use short, poorly random WPA keys that can be cracked
- 802.11i is a “permanent” security fix
  - › Builds on the interim WPA standard (i.e. WPA2)
  - › Replaces RC4 by the more secure Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block encryption
  - › Better key management and data integrity
  - › Uses 802.1x for authentication.

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## Authentication in WLAN Hotspots

- Upon association with the AP, only authentication traffic can pass through, as defined by IEEE 802.1x




- The protocol used to transport authentication traffic is the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP - RFC3748)

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# Dual SSID Approach



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